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INTRODUCTION 
When in October 1949 Moo Tse-Tung ond the Peoples' Liberotion Army 
seized control over mainland China they were faced with the immense problem of 
establishing a stable communist economy. 
When discussing the economy of the Peoples' Republic of China one is 
confronted with the problem of re lying upon somewhat undependable figures con-
cerning growth. This is perhaps due to either the poor system of accounting or the 
want of the country to look as if it is reaching a rather stable condition. There-
fore I have neglected to present many figures for want of hard evidence. I have, 
on the other hand, attempted to show general trends within the economy. This I 
feel will present fairly the current economic condition of the Peoples' Republic 
of China. 
Rather than present a purely chronological account from October 1949 
to the present I have arranged th is report in the following manner. 
The Five Year Plans. Showing the major emphasis of each plan. The first 
five year plans were dedicated to all aspects of Chinese life. However, in later 
years agriculture and industry received the bulk of attention. Therefore, attention 
has been devoted toward these sectors in the latter plans. 
Advances in agriculture and industry. This section deals with the trends 
of growth in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
Factors influencing economic growth. This section presents a look at the 
various policies of resource allocation, the price system, foreign aid and trade, 
capital investing, wages and employment, and gross national product. 
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Looking ahead. Th is final section is an attempt to show how we" the 
Chinese economic system has done in the past twenty-two years. This section also 
states what we can expect from the Peoples' Republic of China and its impact on the 
economy of the rest of the world. 
THE FIVE YEAR PLANS 
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ECONOMIC REHABILITATION 
The Peoples' Republic of China, the most populous country in the world , 
was founded at the end of th irty years of chaos on October 1, 1949. At its head 
was Mao Tse-Tung, chairman of the Communist Party of China, next in the chain 
of command were Liu Shao-ch'i, head of state, and Premier Chou En-Iai. The basic 
economic principles were communistic. However, Chairman Mao added his inter-
pretations. These were that the source of strength is the peasant not the proletariat, 
there must be a permanent confrontation of the classes, there must be an unremitting 
cycl ical pattern of tension and re laxation, and finally violence is the most powerfu I 
incidence of change. 
The first objective was to reform or rehabilitate specific areas of the economy. 
There were five such areas; land, industrial and commercial, financial, social and 
political. 
The goals in land distribution were three- fold. First and foremost, prior 
to 1949 the land-lord class comprised ten percent of the population yet this group 
controlled nearly seventy percent of the total real estate available. This land-lord 
class had been the supporters of the status quo and hence the government was compelled 
to eliminate them. In doing this virtually all of the land-lords' holdings were con-
fiscated. As for the land-lords themselves, many were sent to labor camps for rehab-
ilitation and education in the Commu nist doctrine. 
Secondly, the land that was taken was redistributed to the peasants. This 
appears as though the peasant was receiving a large gift. However, quite the opposite 
occured. Upon the completion of the land reform the average size of landholdings for the 
country as a whole was about two acres. 1 Yet the important task had been completed. 
lNai-Ruenn Chen and Walter Galenson, The Chinese Economy Under Communism, 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), p. 148 
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The peasants now owned their own land and more significant all plots were relatively 
the same size. This was material in promoting the concept of one class or no class 
distinction. 
Finally, the third goal of land reform was to increase agricu Iture output. 
The underlying principle was, if the peasant was farming for himself he would praduce 
a larger harvest than he would if he was working for the land-lord. 
Playing an intricate part in land reform was the cadre. A cadre was a 
member of the party, usually a former member of the Peoples' Liberation Army. His 
goal was, while living and working in a village, to start peasant associations. The 
peasant association, initiated by the cadres, held peoples tribunals and tried land-
lords. Another duty of the cadre was to prepare large class structure lists for the 
redistribution of land. 2 
There was a substantial problem in the elimination of the land-lords. The 
land-lords provided most of the wage fund. This problem, the government felt, would 
be overcome by providing seeds and food enabling the peasants to become self-sufficient. 
In the area of industrial and commercial reform the goal of Ith·e state was to 
be the command post in the design of the business sector. The state was to supervise 
distribution and allocations of all supplies to markets. Also the government was to 
oversee all business operations, labor relations, and technical innovations. 3 
With these goals established the government was obliged to wait until the 
period of collectivization and industri al ization. The main purpose during the re-
habilitation was help the war torn industries back upon their feet. 
2Kai-yu Hsu, "The Chinese Communist Leadersh ip", Current History 
(Sept. 1969), pp. 129-134. ----
3Yuan-1i Wu, The Economy of Communist China, (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), pp. 11-12. 
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The aim of financial reform was to control all phases of monetary policy. 
In achieving this monopoly over the banking system the government was faced with 
two immediate issues. The foremost problem was that the government was confronted with 
the postwar hyperinflation. Rather satisfactory control was exerted over this hyperinflation 
through the concentration of bank deposits, reductions in the liabilities of commercial 
banks, and direct restrictions on the extension of credit. 4 
The second issue was what type of banking system should the Peoples' Republic 
of China have? The answer is simple, it is a duplicate of the Soviet mode I. Hence in 
1950 the Peoples' Bank of China was founded. The process of conjoining the banks 
was relatively simple. Cammerc ial banks were required to increase their capital and 
then gradually consolidate their operations. This amalgamation ultimately led to the 
formation of the state bank. 5 
The Peoples' Bank required that all government enterprises conduct their 
business with other similar units through the bank. All transactions must be cleared 
through the bank and only minor operations can be financed with currency. All enter-
prises are required to draw-up a statement of all receipts and expenditures. Only in the 
case of planned credit can the statement not be in balance. The national plan for 
receipts and expenditures is the basis for all transactions. The bank receives all copies 
of contracts so it may debit or credit the appropriate accounts. The bank can also halt 
any transaction which is not authorized through the nati onal plan. Ente rprises may only 
borrow against their account if specifically stated in the plan and for short term financing. 
4vuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, (New York: 
Frederick A . Praeger, Publishers, 1963), pp. 411-17. 
5 lbid. 
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The banking system has remained relatively unchanged since 1950. It has, 
however, added specific facilities. In 1952 the Agriculture Bank was instated. Also 
it has created special agencies to finance long term capital construction and investments 
in particu lor sectors. 6 
In the area of soci a l reform the government embarked upon a massive campaign 
to drastically rearrange the entire soc ial structure wh ich dated back thousands of years. 
The social structure at the village level was drastically altered with the elimination of 
the land-lord class. The government wanted to eliminate all phases of life that resembled 
capitalism. Consequently the land-lords and their families received a multitude of 
abuse. After public hearings millions were either killed or sent to labor camps. This 
and several other campaigns were launched to prepare the popu lace for collectivization. 
The business sectors also suffered tremendous blows from similar campaigns. 
Two such campaigns were launched at the indurtrialists and merchants. The two campaigns 
were called the "Three-Anti" or San Fan and the "Five-Anti" or Wu Fan. Both were 
attempts to stamp out bourgeois and pro-western attitudes. The San Fan attacked the 
three evils of corruption, waste and bureaucratic abuse of power in government. The 
Wu Fan, the campaign most directed against businessmen, assailed the evils of tax 
evasion, bribery, theft ofstote assets, utilizing knowledge of state economic projects 
for private gain and cheating on labor or materi als.7 
Another program designed to promote communistic I ife also s~rved to 
strengthen nationalistic feelings. It was the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign. 8 
In this thousands of "volunteers" entered Korea to resist the advancing United Nations 
6Wu, pp. 411-17. 
7 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia:Challenge to Americ~n 
Policy, (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 21-2 
Blbid. 
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Troops. The government promoted the theory that after Korea the mainland would be 
invaded. At this time the first national bond issue was circu lated. The name of the 
bond was the Peoples' Victory Bond. 9 
By 1952 the government had completely altered traditional life in the 
Peoples' Republic of China. Many people were firmly convinced that Chairman Mao 
would lead them to a better life with communism. Firm acceptance and a positive 
response to the above mentioned campaigns, and in particular the "Three and Five-
Antis" provided a sturdy base for collectivization. 
In order to unify the country, the Chinese Communists adopted on September 
29, 1949 the Common Program. The Common Program "directed the government to 
'abolish all prerogatives of imperial countries in China' and to 'undertake to wage the 
peoples' war of liberation to the very end, liberate all the territory of China, and 
accomplish the cause of unifying the country.,,10 The instrument of the Common 
Program was the governmental structure. The Communist Party of China (CPC) follows 
the standard Marx-Leninism interpretation of communism. This interpretation pursues 
the doctrines of strong cental control of the party, the elect se lect group of leaders 
know the correct interpretations of Marx, and freedom to reform. In the Chinese 
experiment Mao Tse-Tung adds the doctrine of agrarian and military communism. 
Agrarian communism essentially states that the source of strength comes from the 
peasant and not the proletariat. Military communism implies that there should be 
a continual involvement of the military in the government. 
9Chen and Galenson, pp. 156-7. 
10 Barnett, p. 91 . 
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The frame work of the government in 1950 was as follows: 
National Party Congress 
Central Commi ttee 
Politburo 
Politburo Standing Committee 
Permanent Central Controlling Power 
Local Party Branches 
All levels of the government are imporatant but the source of energy comes 
from the central controlling power. In 1949 the three most important men in the 
government were Mao Tse-Tung; chairman of the CPC , Liu Shao-ch'i; head of state, 
and Premier Chou En-Iai. 
Another important facet of the CPC was the forementioned cadre. Along 
with establishing local parties they aided in firmly promoting the wisdom of Chairman Mao. 
THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN 
By the end of 1952 the government announced that the period ot rehabilitation 
was coming to an end and that the First Five Year Plan for development would begin in 
1953. A formal plan, however, was not drafted until 1955. It seems rafher strange 
that the plan would be put into effect two years prior to its formulation. Yet there are 
two very good reasons for beginning this early. First, and most important, the fore-
mentioned "Five-Anti" campaign of 1952 reduced the economic power of private 
enter prises. The "Five-Antis" were so effective that "by the end of the year private 
enterprises accounted for only 36 percent of the total wholesale trade, 58 percent of 
retai I trade, and 39 percent of factory production, as compared to 76 percent, 84 percent 
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and 52 percent in 1950.,,11 It was, therefore, evident that again the economy needed 
an injection. This came in the form of the First Five Year Plan. 
The underlying objective of the plan was to establish a socialist society 
through "socialist industrialization" .12 This socialist industrialization was to be 
completed over three plans or fifteen years. The first plan covered three major areas, 
agriculture, industry and investment, with socialist industrialization {this has also been 
called state capitalism) the primary mission. 
The plan followed the basic Soviet model. Therefore it may be interesting 
to compare the resources available in 1952 with the Soviet Union's First Five Year Plan. 
Table 1 
Resources of the Peoples' Republic 
of China and the Soviet Union at 
the outset of the First Five Year 
Plans. 13 
Population (millions) 
Crop area per head of rural 
popu lation (acres) 
Per capita output of grain (kg.) 
Railroads (km. per million 
popu lation) 
Electric power generating 
capacity (mill. kw.) 
Industrial Production 
Coal (mill. metric tons) 
Stee I (m ill. metric tons) 
Cement (mill. metric tons) 
Cotton cloth (mill. of meters) 
China 1952 
567 
0.7 
272 
43 
2.0 
63.5 
1.3 
2.9 
4,158 
USSR 1928 
150 
2.3 
566 
513 
1.9 
35.5 
4.3 
1.8 
2,678 
11Choh-Ming Li, Economic Developement of Communist China: An Appraisal 
of the First Five Years of Industrialization, (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 
1959), p. 6. 
12 lbid • 
13Chen and Galenson, p. 35. 
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The Peoples' Republic of China was unquestionably far behind the Soviet 
Union at the start of their first Five Year Plan. Like Ch ina the Soviet Union was not 
then a world power to be reckoned with. Today, almost twenty-two years later China 
is a world power; and like the Soviet their growth started with the First Five Year Plan. 
They seemed to follow a normal course up until 1955 when Chairman Mao 
called for a rapid speed-up of collectivization and social ization. The reason for the 
acce leration of collectivization is rather hard to assess. However, keeping in mind 
that th is formal plan was not announced until 1955 may be of assistance. Perhaps 
the first two years of the plan were not going as well as expected and to "save face" 
collectivization was established to help achieve desired goals. 
Announced agricultural goals were stated in the midst of collectivization 
so it is difficult to ascertain whether the figures are original or adjusted targets. 
The plan called for a 25 percent increase in gross agricu Itural production 
by 1957. This increase was to be accomplished through various development programs. 
The development programs called for expanded cultivated area through 
reclamation, irrigation extenions to increase arable land and unit-area yield, planting 
high yield crops, usage of fertilizers, and the adoption of newer techniques in farming. 
The government's role in this development program was to establish machine tractor 
stations, installation of agricultural schools, and the use of state operated farms 
as experimental stations. 
The agricu Itural portion of this plan also called for the beginn ing of the 
first phase of state capitalism or collectivization. The program was to start with mutual-
aid teams. The teams were to be comprised of from five to eight families who would work 
together during the peak seasons. Until mid-1955 when Chairman Mao increased 
collectivization it appeared as though th is was as far as the government wished to pursue 
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the program. However, with the increment to collectivization, there were no mutual-
aid teams in 1957 as compared to the 40 percent of total households in early 1952. The 
remainder of the program was to be completed in two stages, the formulation of first level 
cooperotives and collectives. 
The first level cooperatives were also called elementary co-operatives. 
These differed from mutual-aid teams in that land and labor was pooled. Members 
of the cooperatives still retained title to the factors of production but their use was 
controlled and planned collectively through local planning committees on this basis 
of targets rece ived from the government planning committee. 
The final step of collectivization was the actual formation of collectives. 
These collectives were called advanced producers cooperatives. Collectives were 
larger than the cooperatives; the outstanding characteristic was common ownersh ip of 
nearly all properties including land. Evidence of the push toward collectivization 
is that in 19552 percent of peasant holdings had joined collectives, but one year later 
the figure rose to 87 percent and by June 1957 to 97 percent. 
The impact of collectivization may be seen by the following table. 
Table II 
Percentage of Chinese families moved from 
Mutual-aid teams to Advanced Cooperatives 
during the First Five Year Plan 14. 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Mutual-Aid Teams 
Elementary Cooperatives 
Advanced Cooperatives 
40.0 
0.1 
40.0 
0.2 
58.0 
2.0 
0.1 
50.0 
14.0 
0.2 
8.5 
87.0 97.0 
14H. Conrad Meyer, "Comparative Economic Systems," Lecture presented 
at Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pennsylvania, March 7, 1972. 
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Compensation for work in the collectives, as well as the elementary 
cooperatives, was tendered in the form of the work-point system .15 This meant that 
each worker was given a norm based upon the performance of an average worker doing an 
average days labor. Work-points were given for the fulfillment of norms. These work-
points were based upon ski II, strength requ ired, and the importance of the task. The 
work-point system weighed heavily in the success of collectivization. Extra work-
point credits or bonuses were granted in the agricultural sector during this period. The 
government apparently realized the importance of the success of the collectives by also 
increasing the amount of credit granted to agriculture. The government "poured three 
times as much agricultural credit into the countryside in 1956 as in 1955, as a means 
of insuring an increase in farm production and in the money income of the household" .16 
The official statistics show that the gross agricultural product rose at a rate 
of 4.8 percent a year. This is very close the the target figure of 5.0 percent per year. 
The reliability of this figure is questionable. However, a look to other figures can 
compare tre success of agricu Iture during the period. One way of judging the final 
product is by looking to the population growth from 1952 to 1957. This again may not 
be competent, but we can measure general patterns in both. Popu lation growth cou Id 
serve as a means of determining how well the agricultural sector performed during the 
First Five Year Plan. The average popu lation growth rate was about 2 percent. 17 This 
suggests that popu lation grew at a rate of ~ the agricu Itural output. Hence it appears 
that the population, though not enjoying an abundance of food, was above the 
15Chen and Galenson, p. 149. 
16U, p. 69. 
17Thomas E. Dow, Jr., "The Population of China," Current History, 
(Sept. 1968) p. 143. 
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subsistance leve I. 
The designated goal for industry was to increase gross industrial output by 
50 percent. Also , the industrial participation in gross national product was to increase 
by 25 percent from 1952 to 1957. The industrial portion of the plan was divided into 
two segments heavy industry and light industry and handicrafts. The announced goal 
was to move from an agricultural nation to an industrialized nation. The major 
concern of industry was directed toward the hinterland with emphasis upon the metal-
lurgical and machine industries. S imu Itaneously the government wanted to deve lop 
railroads and communications in the interior. 
Soviet assistance played an important role in the formulation of the 
industrial plan. The Soviets initially agreed to aid in the construction or reconstruction 
of 156 major industrial plants. The major emphasis was on iron and steel plants, 
electric power stations and machinery plants. 
The presence of private enerprise offers the greatest threat to a Communistic 
system. It was therefore, the prime objective of the C hinese government to nationalize 
industry as fast as possible. The transformation to complete socialization was to advance 
through three stages. The first stage involved smaller industries wh ich were to be formed 
into collectives of like industries. Th is stage was called elementary state capitalism. 
The second stage, advanced state capitalism was a form of joint ownership or partner-
ship between the state and private ente rprise. The final stage was the complete owner-
sh i p by the state. 
At the start of the First Five Year Plan the state did in fact completely 
control roughly 57 percent of all industry. This was due to confiscation during the 
Economic Rehabilitation period. An additional 11 percent was annexed during the 
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"Five-Anti" program. The process, I ike collectivization, was to be relative Iy slow. 
But in mid 1955 the program was greatly accelerated. By the end of 1956 virtually 
all industry was either totally state controlled or in the advanced state capitalism stage. 
The impact of socialization may be seen by the following table. 
Table III 
Percentage of Chinese industry moved from private 
enterprise to state enterprises during the First Five 
Year Plan. 18 
Private enterprise 
Elementary State Capitalism 
Advanced State Capitalism 
State enterprises 
1952 
14 
23 
6 
57 
1955 
3 
13 
16 
68 
1956 
32 
68 
The process of state ownership was accomplished by the government 
purchasing the private enterprise. The industry was assessed and the former owners were 
given bonds for payment. The bonds paid 5 percent per year and were schedu led 
to expire in 1962. With this payment the former owner enjoyed no stock ownership 
and had no share in profits. With completion of payments the industry wou Id then 
move into complete state control. 
The second segment of the industrial plan was for light industry and handi-
crafts. These represented the consumers goods portion of the plan. The investment 
in this sector amounted to about 11 percent of the total investment applied to industry .19 
This allows for few signifcant advances in this area. The value of output essentially 
remained the same throughout the plan. The only significant changes came through 
18Meyer, March 9, 1972. 
19Li , p. 10. 
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the push to socialization with small industries being moved from private enterprises 
to elementary state capitalism then to advanced state capitalism. The same process 
of confiscation was employed in th is sector as in heavy industry. 
Advances in the industrial sector can be largely attributed to Soviet 
assistance. During the period the average increase in heavy industry was 16 percent 
per year while the remaining sector grew 7 percent annually. 20 The general pattern 
of growth was essentially the same as it was during the recovery period. The re lative Iy 
large difference between heavy and light industry is due to the decision to adopt the 
Soviet model of industrialization and concentration in heavy industry. 
THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD 
The First Five Year Plan was hailed as a great success and the time had 
come for the institution of a new economic plan. The planned output was to be even 
greater than the first . plan. 
The crux of the plan was to mobilize human resources to a maximum degree 
by developing both agriculture and industry. Heavy industry was to be subsidized 
by the institution of large labor-intensive projects. Local initiative was to be promoted 
through the decentralization of management. The major campaigns were in the areas 
of water conservation, tool improvement and new technology I local small scale se If-
built labor-intensive industries, and the full development of peoples' communes. It 
appears that agriculture and industry were to come together to be the inspirational 
force in Ch inese life. 
20Robert Michael Field, "Chinese Communist Industrial Production" 
Comparative Development of India and China, ed. Kuan-I Chen and J.S • Uppal, 
(New York, The Free Press, 1971), p. 81. 
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Water conservation projects were to increase the amount of arable land to 
150 million acres and raise the percentage of cultivated land from 31 percent to 56 
percent. 21 This was to be accomplished during the non-planting and non-harvesting 
seasons. The peasant was called upon to aid in the construction of dams and irrigation 
canals. Due to the lack of competent leadersh ip the dams and canals were poorly 
constructed. This meant many lost water and did not perform as expected. 
The second area, tool improvements and new technology in the agricultural 
sector took the form of experimenting with deep plowing, c lose planting, and an 
intensive program of collection of manure fertilizer. The industrial sector was aided 
in the advancement of technology by the presence of Soviet advisors. These advisors 
played an important role in providing for the elevation of innovations. 
The third campaign of the Great Leap followed more closely the policy of 
decentralizing management. This portion dealt with the building of local small scale 
labor-intensive industries. The most important feature of this portion was the installation 
of thousands of backyard blast furnaces. The furnaces were to be used for the production 
of stee I and small implements. Another program was to instaJl home generating stations 
by re-conditioning old vehicle generators. 
The last phase of this Great Leap was to fu IIy deve lop the peoples' communes. 
The agricultural collectives and cooperatives of the First Five Year Plan had been 
replaced with the commune. The communes averaged about 4,600 families. 22 The 
21 Barnett, p. 60. 
22 Wu, p. 78. 
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communes were to be concerned with all facets of life. They were to manage all the 
possible resources in an area. In effect the communes were to be the ultimate in 
Communistic life. 
The Great Leap was to last for five years but it turned into disaster and the 
near collapse of the Peoples' Republic of China after two years. Explanation of the 
failure of the Great Leap may perhaps be rendered through knowledge of opportunity 
costs. Opportunity costs arise through a trade off of one commodity for the production 
of another. The classic example of opportunity costs is the devotion of more resources 
to produce guns means less resources available to produce butter. The opportunity cost 
of guns is the amount of butter foregone. 
While the communes provided a pool of labor they permitted little room for 
specialization. The labor traded off to the various projects most likely could have been 
used in other sectors. For example 3.08 mi Ilion tons of the locally made stee I were un-
usable for modern industrial purposes. 23 Many of the irrigation canals proved to be 
hasti Iy dug and ruined natural irrigation and perhaps raised the water tab Ie. 
The years 1959 and 1960 also proved to be very bad crop years. This made it 
impossible for agriculture to support industrial development. This in turn forced the 
government to reopen rural markets in a few areas in late 1959 and to return private plots 
to the peasants in 1960.24 
A Iso in 1960 Sino-Soviet re lations were severed. The split started with the 
Great Leap and Chairman Mao's dislike for Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy. 
The dispute was over Communistic doctrine. Mao's Great Leap did not follow the normal 
23 Barnett, p. 59. 
24Chen and Galenson, p. 103. 
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progression of Communism and ne ither did Khrushchev's. Several volleys of attacks 
upon each others policies followed and finally in 1960 the Soviets were said to have 
"unscrupu lously withdrawn the 1,390 Soviet speci alists ••• tore up 343 contracts .•• 
and scrapped 257 projects of scientific and technical co-operation all within the 
25 short span of a month" • 
THE PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION AND READJUSTMENT 
This period has no specific name and ran from 1961 to 1965. It seemed that 
the government operated by a series of year to ye ar plans. Following the Great Leap 
the mainland was faced with an overwhelming depression. In fact the gross domestic 
product in 1960-61 declined by 31 percent! 26 This depression can be compared to the 
Great Depression of the United States in 1929-33. It was known as the "Great Slide ". 
While it can be compared to the G reat Depression in the United States (where there was 
a 30 percent decline in GNP through the period), there are two notable differences. The 
Great Slide occurred in little over a year whereas the Great Depression spanned four 
years. Secondly in the United States investment fell, whereas in China, due to the seri-
ous grain shortages consumption fell. 
The government devoted the majority of their effort toward agriculture and the 
consumer goods industries. Heavy industry was to support these two sectors. 
The major objective was to recover agricu Iture through modern technology. The 
use of electricity, machinery, and improvement of irrigation were the main implements to 
improve agricultural production. 
25Chu-Yuon Cheng, Economic Relations Between Peking and Moscow, (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964), p. 95. 
26Wu, p. 158. 
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Through out the period, resource allocation seems to have been adjusted to 
a statisfactory level. Machine production was revised to provide tractors, pumps, and 
farm implements. Also quality control was stressed. After the reorganization of priori-
ties industrial output rose sharply again. The readjustment lasted roughly a year and by 
1962 the 1960 level had been about 2/ 3 restored. Evidence is shown by the following 
table. 
Index 
450 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
Table IV 
I ndex of Modern I ndustry output, 
1952-1962. (1952 := 100)27 
Y c := 109.52+23 .51x 
" 
o 195~2~------~19~5~5------------~19~670----~1962 
Year 
This growth shows a substantial effort toward fulfillment of the new policy. 
The number of tractors in use at the reinstated machine tractor stations increased by 
approximately 40,000 from 1959 to 1962. Also production of chemical fertilizer in-
creased over the period by roughly 1.6 million tons. 
The progress of this "agriculture first" policy can be greatly attributed to 
the industrial policy. Once the planners realized the importance of this the agricul-
tural sector was able to get back upon its feet and remain relatively stable. 
27 Wu, p. 126. 
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The disastrous effect and recovery can be seen by the following table. 
Table V 
Grain output of the Peoples' Rebpulic 
of China, 1957-65. 
(in million tons)28 
Year Output 
1957 185 
1958 250 
1959 270 
1960 150 
1961 162 
1962 174 
1963 183 
1964 200 
1965 200 
Production had been restored to the pre-Leap period in three years. Th is 
figure is impressive and it appears that the country was doing well. However, keeping 
in mind that the population increases by 2 percent per year is rather disturbing. The 
important point to remember in this instance is that when the irrigation projects were 
restored there was an increase of approximately 20 million hectares. With the economic 
recovery from 1961 to 1964 the government was ready to issue The Third Five Year Plan. 
THE THIRD FIVE YEAR PLAN 
Published in 1966 the Third Five Year Plan was to increase agriculture pro-
ductivity, reinforce industrialization, and raise the standards of living of the populace. 
Planning was still decentralized. Industries received control figures concerning planned 
cost, quantity, and employment while the agricultural sector received output targets. 
28Chen and Galenson, p. 98. 
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The basic concept was to continue the growth which took place between 1961 and 1965. 
Shortly after the plan was initiated the Cultural Revolution erupted. One of 
the major issues of the Cultural Revolution was the future path of the Chinese economy. 
The dispute caused a split along party lines between Chairman Mao and the party appara-
tus lead by Liu Shao-Ch'i. Liu and his supporters favored centralized economic planning 
and emphasized technical expertise. Where as Mao preferred decentralized planning , 
self-reliant economic operations, and an elimination of specific classes by a mixture of 
ideas between the expert and the worker. 
Also Mao sought to revitalize the revolutionary spirit similar of that which was 
present during the early days of the republic. Aligned with Mao were the Peoples' Libera-
tion Army (led by Lin Piao who is today the heir apparent to the Chairmanship), radical 
party members, and the Red Guards. Liu and his followers were still disillusioned by the 
policies of the Great Leap and also felt that the people wanted a settled way of life. 
It is difficu It to assess the effects of the Cu Itural Revolution. At first many 
people believed that it was going to be a repeat of the Great Leap. The spirit of the revo-
lution swept through the country. Schools were closed, many factories were closed, and 
there were serious grain shortages. 29 Also" ..• Shanghai's heavy industry as a whole was 
operating at about 50 percent capacity .•. consumers industries were lagging about 30 per-
cent behind their normal production levels". 30 There is little doubt that the country was 
in serious trouble during the period. Industrial production and grain output were said to 
have only achieved those levels reached during the Post-Leap period. 
29 Louis Barcarta, China in the Throes of the Cultural Revolution, (New York: 
Hart Publishing Co., 1968), p. 275. 
30 Ibid 
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The unrelenting pressures on the economy forced Mao's opposition to give in 
and try to restore production . O n April 14, 1969 at the Ninth Communist Party Con-
gress the Party adopted a new constitution bringing to a close the Cultural Revolution. 
The new constitution specifically stated that Mao is to be the head of the CPC with 
Lin Piao as his successor. The dynamic portion of the new constitution is the decen-
tralization of government activity. 31 
The overpowering aspect of the revolution is the positive ideological effect 
it has upon the popu lace. 
THE FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN 
The Fourth Five Year Plan was launched in 1970 with the new constitutional 
policy of decentrali zat ion. The e mphasis is to modernize agriculture. The goal is to 
make each county self-reliant by being able to produce its own food and light industrial 
products. Another feature of the plan was the re-introduction of population control 
(first introduced during the Firs t Five Year Plan but suspended since the Great Leap 
period). The traditional figure was set at an increase of 2 percent per year. Now with 
the introduction of contraceptive devices and an increase in the marriage age require-
ment the population growth rate is said to have dropped appreciably to 1.5 percent.32 
It appears that while suffering an economic set back during the Cultural 
Revolution the people are working harder now then ever before and the economy is 
making a comeback. Grain production is reported to have had a record year in 1970 
of 240 million metric tons. 33 Also there are accounts such as "Under the impetus of the 
31 "New Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party", Current History, 
(Sept. 1969), pp. 176-80. 
32 Tillman Durdin, "Birth Rate Is Cut In New Society," Report Frbm Red 
China, ed. The New York Times, (New York: Avon Publishers, 1972), pp. 191-3. 
33 Seymour Topping, "Economic Policy Stresses Local Self-Help," Report 
From Red China, pp. 213-18. ---
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Cultural Revolution we have greatly increased output and turned out 2,600 sets of 
machines in 1970 as compared with 1,600 in 1966.,,34 
The Peoples' Republic of China appears to be returning to the policy of 
striving to become a modern industrial nation. The present policy is dubbed "Socialist 
Cooperation" 35 and is to couple small and large plants. Large plants provide basic 
machinery and expertise while small plants are to act as suppliers and markets for the 
large fi rms • 
34Durdin, "An In-Depth Look at Shanghai," Report From Red China, 
p. 132 . 
35 Chu-Yuan Cheng, "China's Industry: Advances and Di lemma," 
Current History, (Sept. 1971), pp. 154-59. 
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AGRICULTURE 
The Peoples' Republic of China like any other developing nation is faced 
with the problem of increasing agricultural production while transferring resources into 
more productive non-agricultural sectors. Two methods have been tried in order to 
raise agricultural output. First by increasing the cultivated land area and secondly by 
increasing the leve I of land productivity. 
The major concern in increasing the cultivated land is water conservation. 
The project, though well intended, suffered from the dilemma of decentralization. Work 
projects were not coordinated between provinces. Hence, it is probable that dikes and 
levies were built differently in each province. Therefore during heavy rains some levies 
would contain excess water whereas others would not. First attempts to greatly increase 
the arable land proved frugal; also due to poor construction. However, lately construc-
tion of irrigation canals has been devoted to the rebuilding of existing facilities. 
To increase the level of land productivity the government has embarked upon 
a sustained drive to collect manure and manufacture chemical ferti lizer. Through the 
collection drives, production by small and large plants, and importation the supply of 
chemical fertilizers is to have reached an unpresidented level of 14 million tons in 
1970. 36 
Agricultural grain production has fluctuated with the economic programs of 
the nation. During the rehabilitation period grain output regained the pre-World War II 
level and continued to increase slowly until the Great Leap Forward. The Great Leap 
presents a problem with the actual production. Perhaps the extensive program of irriga-
36Yuan-li Wu, "Food and Agriculture in Mainland China," Curre,nt 
History, (Sept. 1971), pp. 160-64. 
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tion did temporarily increase the grain output. This fact is hard ta assess due to the pre-
vailing economic conditions during the period. If the projects of the Great Leap were a 
success then the following three years marked their resounding failure. In the 1960's the 
policy turned to "agriculture first" in an attempt to make the agricultural sector self-
sufficient. As the following table shows, grain production is increasing slowly. However, 
the important fact to remember is that while grain output is rising gradually the population 
growth rate is declining. The present rate is said to have declined from 2 percent per year 
to between 1.8 and 1 .5 percent. 
Table VI 
Estimate of Grain Production in the Peoples' Republic 
of China 1949-1971. 
{in million tons} 
Economic Rehabilitation (1949-52) 
First Five Year Plan (1953-57) 
Great Leap Forward {1958-59} 
Consolidation and Readjustment (1960-65) 
Third Five Year Plan (1966-70) 
Fourth Five Year Plan (First year only) 
Output 
From To 
108.1 
156.9 
250.0 
150.0 
200.0 
230 
154.4 
185.0 
270.0 
200.0 
215.0 
The important feature of Table VI is the gradual increases in production of 
grain. This seems to indicate that regardless of the climatic conditions the government 
is attaining fields which are stable in yield. Suggesting that the fields are weather-
proof and can resist insect and disease damage. 
It appears that the Chinses are becoming some what self-sufficient in food 
grain. In fact the current output" ••. wou Id suffice to maintain a caloric intake of 
about 1800 per capita per day from grain, this is far from being a starvation, or un-
healthful diet. .• ,,37 With advancements in the fertilization process the government will 
37 Wu, pp. 160-64. 
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be able to re lease more and more grain for indirect consumption. Indirect consumption 
in this instance means animal feed and processed foods. 
Critics of the current policy say that if the Chinese are increasing grain pro-
duction why must they sti II import wheat from other nations? The answer to this is rather 
practical. The government has continually increased rice production. The average leve I 
of exportation during 1967-1969 was 900,000 tons a year.38 Rice brings a higher price 
than wheat in the world market, representing a favorable balance of trade between the 
two commodities. 
An outstanding feature of the present agricultural program is that if it continues 
to be deve loped along with small scale industry in the rural areas more funds wi II be re-
leased for production of investment goods. 
INDUSTRY 
Industry in the Peoples' Republic of China has gone through several changes 
since 1949. Upon take over the major objective was to rebuild the existing factories. 
There was an increase in the heavy industrial sector during the First Five Year Plan. Dur-
ing the Great Leap industry was decentralized however investment continued to grow. The 
disastrous effect that the Great Leap had upon the economy forced a turn around in policy 
during the Consolidation and Redistribution period. The policy was "agriculture first" 
and industry was to accommodate agricu Iture. Agricu Iture contineed to be first and indus-
trial production grew unti I the Cu (tural Revolution where many plants were shut-down or 
forced to work at a limited capacity. During this period, undoubtedly, industrial output 
suffered greatly. Since then, however, output seems to be growing rapidly. The call 
38 Wu, pp. 160-64. 
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now is for decentralization with small industrial plants intersperced through the country-
side. The major objective is to link small and large plants. Large plants provide basic 
equipment and technology while small plants supply raw materials and markets for the 
large plants. 
Two problems have faced the industrial sector for quite some time. Both are 
policies effecting production and profit. The first problem is that of a dual economy. 
During the Great Leap this was called "walking on two legs" by Chairman Mao. This 
policy calls for the capital-intensive and labor-intensive factions to work side by side. 
This concept is not unique only to China but to most developing nations. The problem 
is to develop a median between the two. The labor-intensive programs take longer to 
complete but unemployment is minimized. On the other hand, capital-intensive programs 
can be completed relatively quickly and are able to service the building of other sectors 
of the economy. However, with capital-intensive projects unemployment rises. 
The second problem is perhaps somewhat greater. It is called "anti-economism".39 
During the Cu Itural Revolution cost accounting systems were abol ished as be ing capitalistic. 
The significance of this is that profits can not be measured to determine the amount of in-
vestment necessary. This can only resu It in inefficiency through either over or under invest-
ment. 
Industrial output however has been increasing. There appears to be a large 
scale drive to establish small industries throughout the country-side. In fact, in a recent 
official report" ••• more than 90 percent of the counties in the nation have erected net-
works of small plants which can produce walking tractors, small-sized power machines, 
39Cheng, pp. 154-159. 
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farm implements and spare parts, chemical fertilizer, coal, cement, iron and steel" .40 
Also the government has been placing interest in several industries, the following is an 
analysis of the development of a few selected industries: 
Electrical Power - In 1952 the capacity of existing electrical plants 
amounted to 1.96 million kilowatts. 41 Priority was given to the 
building of thermal units due to the expediency with which they 
can be built. The trend has turned recently to the building of 
local power plants utilizing both the excellent rivers and the 
abundance of labor to where nearly all of the counties supply 
their own electrical power.42 
Fuel - The coal industry in early years rece ived a very high priority 
with the emphasis placed upon steel. The output grew rapidly 
and there were reports that the Peoples' Republic of China 
ranked third in world production. However, in recent years 
China is facing the problem of serious shortages.43 
The petroleum industry did not actually expand rapidly 
until very recently. However, there have been various new 
finds which in turn will stimulate other factors of the indus-
trial sector. 
40 Cheng, pp. 154-159. 
41 Chen and G alenson , p. 78. 
42 Cheng, pp. 154-159. 
43 Cheng, pp. 154-159. 
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Electronics - The Chinese can now produce a wide range of electrical 
equipment and components. Technological advances have greatly 
improved the ship building and nuclear industries. These improve-
ments have enabled the Chinese to compete with the Soviet Union 
and the United States in the arms race. 
The important event in the ou tlook for industry is the attempt for most counties 
to become self-sufficient. If this can be accomplished, more and more funds wi" be able 
to be provided for investment. If this is to happen, however, there must be a turn about 
in the policy of anti-economism. This would allow industries to become more efficient by 
correctly calculating planned il'Nestment. 
FACTORS INFLUENC ING GROWTH 
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RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
The Peoples' Republic of China has established as their economic goal, 
through their short history, to build as rapidly as possible a great industrial and mili-
tary state. The accomplishment of these goals is to be determined by Party ideology, 
political ambition, and the underdeveloped nature of the economy. 
Resource allocation in the Chinese experience has been controlled through 
two methods. The first method is exerted by direct control through the state planning 
structure. The basic concept is to control the assignment of jobs and to control trans-
fers of labor from one industry to another or from one geograph ic area to another. An-
other technique employed by the planning structure is direct control over the monetary 
system. This process ca lis for all transfers of goods payments to pass through the State 
Bank. 
The second method of controlling resource allocation is the mobilization of 
savings which inturn is converted to capital investment. Capital investment is financed 
in total through state enterprises. Revenues come through profits of state enterprises 
and by taxes upon the industrial and agricu Itural sectors. 
Profits since the Fourth Five Year Plan are not being calculated. However, 
it seems that revenues are disbursed according to the need of each industry. Taxes on 
industry are mostly transfer taxes. This is a tax imposed at each level of finished goods. 
If a product takes four stages of production from raw material to finished product, it is 
taxed four times. 44 The transfer tax has different names in various economic systems; 
44Choh-Ming Li, Economic Development of Communist China, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1959), p. 150. 
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in the United States it is called the "value added" tax. Agricu Itural taxes are imposed 
on gross farm output. The drawback of th is is that the tax is imposed on norma I rather 
than actual yield. 45 This was particularly significant in poor harvest years. During 
early years of development this created serious problems, however, recently the crop 
yield has been consistent, averting any serious crisis. 
The Chi nese in recent years and during the Fourth Five Year Plan have devoted 
their attention toward the making of a completely autarky46 state. From all appearances 
this has been accomplished. 
MARKET PRICES AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 
The function of a command economy is to adjust demand to supply which 
accordingly reflects the price. The price is determined by the addition of constant 
capital (labor) plus variable capital (wages) plus surplus value (unrenumerated number 
of hours put into labor). The equation is as follows: 
p = c + v + s 
Excluded in the computation are interest and land rent. The exclusion of 
land rent is of particu lar importance when computing the price of agricu ltural products. 
This problem has been adjusted to by the use of average purchase prices. 47 The manipu-
latlon of these prices in early development was important. Prices could be raised and 
lowered on specific commodities stimulating the supply of these items. Today the inter-
connection of both the agricultural and the industrial sectors has eliminated the need for 
adjusting these prices. 
45Chen and Galenson, p. 156. 
46Briefly, an autarky is a state which is completely self-sufficient being 
non-dependent upon imports from other nations. 
47Chen and Galenson, p. 164. 
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TRADE AND FOREIGN AID 
Foreign trade hos constituted a major factor in the effort to modernize 
the economy. In the early years the government relied heavily upon the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe to provide the greatly needed technology, capital goods, 
and materials. 
Trade in agricultural goods has been used to compensate for grain shortages 
of the past. Today even though the agricultural sector is relatively stable the Chinese 
continue to import wheat. The reason for this is that there has been an effort to export 
large quantities of rice which earns a higher price than wheat; constituting a favorable 
ba I once of trade in the agr i cu I tu ro I sector. 
Due to the split in relotlons with the Soviet Union trade declined sharply 
until 1964. Trade, since then, has been with the less developed countries of Asia and 
Africa. The Chinese have little to offer in the way of luxury goods so many of the goods 
exported have been textiles and industrial materials. 48 
Foreign aid can possibly help to explain how the government plans to regain 
a high volume of trade. The Peoples' Republic of China since 1956 has been extending 
aid for trade commitments. In January 1964 Premier Chou En-Iai announced an eight 
point plan concerning foreign aid policy. Several of these points were" ••• aid should 
always be mutual, never unilateral, and it should be without preconditions on privileges 
which would adversely affect the national sovereignty of the assisted country ••. loans 
are to be interest free .•• the object of assistance is to make the countries independent .• .',49 
48Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign 
Trade, (New York: McGraw-Hili Book Co., 1966lr pp. 114-115. 
49 Jan S. Prybyla, "Foreign Aid: The Chinese Are Coming," Current History, 
(Sept. 1971lr pp. 142-147. 
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The peculiar characteristic of aid grants is their repayment through the pur-
chase of Chinese goods by the grantee. The extension of foreign aid can be seen by the 
following table. 
Table VII 
Chinese Aid Commitments 1956-1970 
(million U.S. dollars)50 
1956-1960 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
Total 
$ 70.6 
793.0 
760.0 
$ 1623.6 
Chinese aid grants and trade can be critisized as being quite small in terms 
of the world trading leaders. Yet the important point is that the economy is so large 
and diversified that even a small increase in the favorable balance of trade can increase 
economic activity greatly. 
In recent years the value of foreign trade has amounted to about 4 percent of 
the gross national product. The total volume of trade has been estimated at $8.0 billion 
by 1980.51 Also since shortly before the Soviet pull-out Chinese have maintained a 
favorable balance of trade. There is no reason to believe that in the future this policy 
will change. 
Table VIII shows how the Chinese have fared in world trade. 
50 Prybyla, pp. 142-147. 
51 Eckstein, pp. 114-115. 
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Table VIII 
Chinese Trade from 1950 to 1980 
(million U.S. dollars)52 
Imports 
\ Exports 
a 195~0---------1 -96-0---------1-97-0---------1-980 
Year 
The Chinese in the future will be competing with the major world powers for 
world trade and if the present policy of foreign aid and trade continues they should be 
able to expand their economy greatly. 
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS 
The government employs the basic Soviet model in investment projects. This 
system is called the Coefficient of Relative Effectiveness or C.R.E. 53 The equation is 
as follows: 
Where E = method and C =capital. The coefficient determines the percent of cost in-
volved in the investment. 
52 The figures from 1950 to 1965 were taken from data compi led by Robert L. 
Price, "International Trade of Communist China, 1950-1965", Chen and Uppal, p. 338. 
Figures from 1966 to 1980 are projections based upon Mr. Eckstein's estimate~. 
53 Harry Schwartz, An Introduction to the Soviet Economy, (Columbus, Ohio: 
Chas.E.Merrill Publishing Co., 1968), p. 99. 
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One would think that this type of system could not work in the Peoples ' 
Republic of China because of the large work force. However, with the current de-
centralization policy this seems to fit into the planners schedule. The work force is 
localized and the planners know exactly the number of people to mobilize for particu-
lar projects. Therefore, the cost of labor can be determined effective Iy. 
The trend of investment today, as earlier stated, is to "see the country as a 
chessboard" .54 Formerly, the aim was directed toward heavy industry but with the policy 
of "agriculture first" the emphasis is on promoting the agricultural sector to the point 
where it becomes self-sufficient. In accomplishing this investment then can be devoted 
to increasing capital goods production. 
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT 
The basic formula for wage payments is designed so that there are incentives 
or bonuses. However, the payment of wages is not to exceed the productivity by a 
stated percentage, usually approximately 50 percent. 
The payment of wages in the agricu Itural section is based upon the T achai 
Work - Point System and in the industrial sector the wage system is based upon the Anshan 
Constitution .55 Both of these systems were instated during the Cu Itural Revolution. How-
ever, they resemble the policies followed in the past of the work-point systems. The only 
difference is the connotation of the Maoist revision which occurred during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
54Topping, p. 214. 
55 Jan S. Prybyla, "China's Economy: Experiments in Maoism", Current 
History (Sept. 1970), pp. 159-164. 
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The labor force in the Peoples' Republic of China has been disbursed throughout 
the country as a result of the Cultu ral Revolution. 56 This allows for better planning of 
local projects. Hence a more efficient use of available labor. 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
The Gross National Product for the Peoples' Republic of China has grown since 
1950. The growth pattern followed the course of the various plans. There was a gradual 
increase until the Great Leap and then decline with the resulting "Great Slide" followed 
by a period of redevelopment which caused G.N.P. to again increase slowly. There was 
a leveling effect caused by the Cultural Revolution at wh ich G.N.P. was reportedly $94 
billion in 1969. Gross National Product has been projected to be $178 billion by 1980, 
representing a growth rate of 6 percent per year. 57 This figure represents roughly one-
fifth of the United States G.N.P. in 1968. Table IX shows the pattern of Chinese G.N.P. 
projected to 1980. 
56 Merle Goldman "The Aftermath of China's Cu ltural Revolution", Current 
History, (Sept. 1971), pp. 165-170. ---
57 Kuan-I Chen, "Prospects for the Chinese Economy", Comparative Deve lop-
ment of India and China, Chen and Uppal, p. 376. 
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Table IX 
Chinese Gross National Product 1950 
to 1980. (Bi"ions U.S. dollars) 58 
o 195~0----------19-6-0---------1-9-7-0 ---------1-980 
Year 
The growth to 1980 of course is fu IIy dependent upon the fact that there are 
no major changes in economic policy. 
58 Based upon figures provided in Chen and Galenson, p. 169 for 1950 
to 1965. The projection to 1980 is taken from Mr. Chen's estimate. 
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In looking toward the future of the Chinese economy it appears that it will 
continue to mature into a notable world power. 
Criticism of many capitalistic countries has come in the form of ways to im-
prove the economic system. A capitalistic system is so designed that it is supposed to run 
itself. However, sometimes the built-in mechanisms fail making the system easy to criti-
size. A theoretical communistic system, because it is planned, does not have this feature. 
Therefore, the system can only be critisized for its technology. It is in this context that 
the Peoples' Republic of China should be evaluated . 
In its brief history the economy has taken many turns. It has gone from centra-
lized planning to decentralized planning (the current state) no less than three times., Both 
types of planning have succeeded in increasing the standard of living. The government's 
first attempt at decentralization (the Great Leap Forward) ended in complete disaster. 
The apparent reason for this being that the economy and the populace was not ready for 
such an injection. The planning techniques had not been sophisticated enough to absorb 
the impact of planning the distribution of labor efficiently. 
On the other hand, a decentralization policy is currently working and from all 
evidence it is doing rather well. A possible explanation for this could be that the quality 
of education has increased greatly. The planners on the local level are capable of making 
competent decisions. 
The question then is raised as to the labor force. Is there full employment in 
the Peoples' Republic of China or is there wide spread unemployment? The answer is dif-
ficult to assess and, of course, the government would not relinquish an~ figures concerning 
unemployment. There is, however, an important fact to remember. The people have been 
disbursed throughout the country. These people are required to stay in the provinces to 
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which they are assigned. The conclusion to be drawn from this is the people can not go 
to other areas searching employment causing under-employment in the area they came 
from or over-employment in the area into which they are moving. 
There also seems to be no current problem in feeding the population. The 
current grain output has been increasing at a rate of approximately 4 percent per year 
while the estimated population growth rate is about 1.5 percent per year. This indicates 
two significant factors. First, this is evidence that there is no wide spread starvation. 
Secondly, there is sufficient grain to feed livestock. 
Another possible reason for the current decentralization policy working well 
could be the outcome of the Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao wanted to revitalize 
the revolutionary spirit present during the founding of the government. From all appear-
ances he has accomplished this. Many of the accounts of Mr. Nixon's current trip show 
pictures of Chairman Mao and his sayings. Also there were stories of virtually everyone 
carrying his Red Book. This is very important in establishing a firm ideological accept-
ance to Mao's communism. 
There may have been another reason for the Cu Itural Revolution quite different 
than that of the Great Leap Forward. During the Great Leap it is believed that Mao was 
making a play at be ing the leader of the communist world. This does not seem to be the 
case during the Cultural Revolution. Most of the top officials in the government are now 
over 65 years of age. Perhaps Mao was trying to insure that his doctrine wi II be carried 
out after the current leaders pass away. 
At any rate the current resurgence of Maoist thought has been reflected in the 
attitude of the people. The current rate of growth in Gross National Product is 6 percent 
per year. It does not seem likely that this will change in the near future. 
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There are, however, two drawbacks that resulted from the Cu Itural Revolu-
tion which must be resolved if the Peoples' Republic of China is to become the world's 
leading nation. The first is the pol icy of anti-economism. This policy abol ished the 
use of profits as a measure of efficiency. Without this cost, and most important invest-
ment , is very hard to calcu late. This can only cause the mis-management of funds 
making the enterprises highly inefficient. Secondly, the policy of self-sufficiency may 
tend to deter the introduction of new technology. This does not seem to be the general 
trend though. Evidence of this can be shown by the fact the Chinese are willing to 
trade with the more deve loped nat ions of the world. 
The introduction of new technology is the key to the future of the Peoples' 
Republic of China. The Chinese have many favorable assets; land, an abundance of 
natural resources, a large labor force, and a high spirit of nationalism. Yet innava-
tions must be presented. These innovations currently must come from the United States 
and Western Europe. These areas, in turn, must be prepared to absorb the labor-inten-
sive products which the C hinese can supply cheaply. This is the pattern of trade that is 
the nations best hope for the future. 
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